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/marxism/ - Marxism

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File: 25f2cd26170a801⋯.jpg (129.48 KB, 472x640, 59:80, ribbentrop-and-stalin-at-t….jpg)

 No.74

remember when Stalin shook hands with nazis and then allied with western imperialist powers?

lmao

 No.75

File: 0e6f90f4d59877a⋯.jpg (229.15 KB, 800x578, 400:289, ribbentrop_stalin.jpg)

we must critically support the nazis against british imperialism lol


 No.76

File: b306de56c760b03⋯.jpg (55.49 KB, 620x534, 310:267, 355w-8.jpg)

lol remember when they said the old bolsheviks were spies for england/japan/nazi germany?

not suspicious at all!


 No.77

File: 9c6ddb9e051db61⋯.jpg (65.95 KB, 647x900, 647:900, piatakov.jpg)

>hmm…today should i let the capitalists crush the revolution in greece, or disband the comintern? WHY NOT BOTH.


 No.85

Theorylet here, guessing this s a leftcom board. What are your problems with the soviet union? Hard to get a good discussion on /leftypol/ without tankies getting upset at critiquing uncle Joe.


 No.86

>>75

>we must critically support the nazis against british imperialism

This post approved by Bordiga gang

https://libcom.org/forums/history/bordiga-leninist-who-put-his-hopes-axis-27122017


 No.88


 No.90

>>85

>Theorylet here, guessing this s a leftcom board.

It's just a Marxist board. There is no coherent leftcom ideology anyway.

>What are your problems with the soviet union?

The USSR was probably 60% good, 40% bad.

The positive outweighs the negative, but not by much. The good parts were the fact that it inspired people with the idea that history-changing revolutions are possible, that capitalism is not the end of history, etc. It also kept alive the ideas of Marx, even if they tended to interpret his theories in bad ways. Another good part was that it actually gives us an experience to learn from. The USSR also achieved massive industrial development and raised the cultural level of the population.

The bad parts were:

1. Created political division between Marxists and other left-wing ideologies.

2. Made people think that state-capitalism = socialism.

3. Reduced the "moral value" of socialist ideas in the eyes of many people.

4. Made socialism into something authoritarian and bureaucratic.

5. Turned Marxist theory into a justification for whatever policy the USSR pursued at the time.

6. Almost everything Stalin did.

>Hard to get a good discussion on /leftypol/ without tankies getting upset at critiquing uncle Joe.

I made this thread as a joke when one of the vols (probably the ex-BO) permabanned me for criticizing Stalin's USSR.


 No.91

>>85

tl;dr USSR started leaving the revolutionary trajectory in mid-20s and as the time went on the counterrevolutionary nature of Russia became more and more apparent, the culmination of which was joining one of imperialist camps in WW2. Consider reading this.

https://libriincogniti.wordpress.com/2018/08/01/prometeo-the-tactics-of-the-comintern-1926-1940/

And then we have an ideological justification of the newly emerged state of affairs(socialist wage labor, socialist commodity production and more of such cancer), whose critiques you might already know, if not from actually having read Marx and Engels, then at least from le armchair man.

>>90

>The USSR was probably 60% good, 40% bad. (…)

<For him, M. Proudhon, every economic category has two sides – one good, the other bad. He looks upon these categories as the petty bourgeois looks upon the great men of history: Napoleon was a great man; he did a lot of good; he also did a lot of harm.

<The good side and the bad side, the advantages and drawbacks, taken together form for M. Proudhon the contradiction in every economic category.


 No.95

Trotsky's widow later resigned from the 4th International because they kept repeating the same formula about the USSR being a "worker's state" even though the workers were no longer in command.

>It should be clear to everyone that the revolution has been completely destroyed by Stalinism. Yet you continue to say that under this unspeakable regime, Russia is still a workers state or with socialism. They are the worst and the most dangerous enemies of socialism and the working class. You now hold that the states of Eastern Europe over which Stalinism established its domination during and after the war, are likewise workers states. This is equivalent to saying that Stalinism has carried out a revolutionary socialist role. I cannot and will not follow you in this.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/sedova-natalia/1951/05/09.htm


 No.171

File: cea05451f6533e7⋯.jpg (77.46 KB, 766x539, 766:539, cea05451f6533e7f3cf98b5d5f….jpg)


 No.179

File: 12cc19539ab49a4⋯.png (167.68 KB, 1002x1002, 1:1, aacc19359dcd1cbfe4e74884fb….png)

>>90

>Created political division between Marxists and other left-wing ideologies.

Those existed in Marx's time already, and do you know what kind of shitshow the Second International was? If anything the Marxist-Leninist principle of democratic centralism has overcome factionalism, at least until the Sino-Soviet split. Let's not give Leftcommunism and Trotkyism too much credit: They were fringe tendencies that botched everything they touched, the majority of all socialists were behind the Soviet Union.

>Made people think that state-capitalism = socialism.

Not this old meme…

https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1969/08/statecapitalism.htm

>Reduced the "moral value" of socialist ideas in the eyes of many people.

What does that even mean? People like Hannah Arendt, Pablo Picasso and Albert Einstein praised Stalin. The anti-communist cliches surged when the Cold War started to unfold, suddenly you had figures like Robert Conquest (CIA asset) lying about death counts. This would have happened either way no matter how "nice" you try to make socialism look like. I mean Cuba at this point as a fully-functioning democracy and people still call it a dystopian dictatorship.

>Made socialism into something authoritarian and bureaucratic.

Same argument basically.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/10/authority.htm

>Turned Marxist theory into a justification for whatever policy the USSR pursued at the time.

Examples? It wasn't the USSR which forced the split with China.

>Almost everything Stalin did.

Oh please do tell me more.


 No.180

>>171

Not to mention the USSR opposed all of these and was ignored by the West. Even until the last moment they tried to forge an alliance with France and the UK.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3223834/Stalin-planned-to-send-a-million-troops-to-stop-Hitler-if-Britain-and-France-agreed-pact.html

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is definitely one of the weakest arguments against Stalin.


 No.181

File: 3f59a340ca2f96b⋯.jpg (290.98 KB, 637x900, 637:900, union.jpg)

Love you leftcoms. The ammount of idealism in this thread warms my heart.

>>77

>should i let the capitalists crush the revolution in greece

There was a deal stuck between USSR and UK for Greece to remain in UK's sphere of infleunce. The USSR didn't want to provoke war after the disaster that was WW2. Quoting from William Bloom's book Killing Hope

"At a meeting with Yugoslav leaders in early 1948 (a few months before Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union), described by

Milovan Djilas, second-in-command to Tito, Stalin turned to the foreign minister

Edvard Kardelj and asked:

"Do you believe in the success of the uprising in Greece?"

Kardelj replied, "If foreign intervention does nor grow, and if serious political and

military errors are not made."

Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj's opinion: "If, if! No, they have

no prospect of success at all. What, do you think that Great Britain and the United

States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit you to

break their line of communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. And we have

no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible."

>>90

>2. Made people think that state-capitalism = socialism.

It was socialism. Stop being an utopian and thinking since a socialist revolution doesn't work the way you like it's state-capitalism. This is closer to utopian socialism, which Engels critized, than anything resembling Marxism. Should things be done differently? certainly, it failed after all. That doesn't mean you should reject it and believe bourgeoise lies. What kind of argument even is this? Bolshevik bad, me good? You have to explain why things won't go the way they did. Otherwise you are writting fiction.

>4. Made socialism into something authoritarian and bureaucratic.

It was Russia who did. No, Russia wasn't your precious western democracy; rather it was an authoritarian place full of poverty and misery. Don't expect for a socialist state to be able to brush history away within few decades. Most of the "evil" things USSR did can be conected towards it's history and culture; not the "evil moustache man".

>>91

>socialist wage labor

Labor was not a commodity in the SU. A use value can only become a commodity when it has lost it's use to owner. Seeing the socialist nations had near 100% employment, it can be deduced it wasn't a commodity.

>socialist commodity production

Doing it any other way was impossible. I mean for that to happen Stalin either had to go even harder in his colectivization campaign and wreck the planning economy which was already struggling when it came to services. Let's also be honest, it's not that you care about those things. They simply exist as excuses to have some form of "critisism" about USSR without thinking much about it.


 No.188

>>171

The only relevant period on that list is 1939. By summer of 1939 it became obvious to even Great Britain that the policy of appeasement had failed and that Germany would not uphold its agreements. The USSR waited until the precise moment when it appeared the Western Allies might resist Germany and flipped 180 degrees. This allowed Germany to beat Poland and then France without having to worry about fighting on a second front. These successes allowed the Germans to fight the USSR in 1941 without the worry of a second front.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a colossal blunder. And even if the Western Allies bore responsibility for not making a deal with the USSR in 1939, this didn't preclude the possibility of the USSR simply withholding aid from Germany instead of shipping it massive quantities of vital raw materials during 1940-1941. The immediate consequences of the pact also damaged the moral standing of the USSR for decades. The invasion of Finland turned a neutral neighbor into an enemy. The Soviet invasion of the Baltic states and Poland also led to separatist problems decades later that ultimately led to the breakup of the USSR.


 No.189

Shit board tbh

(No NSFW spam.)

 No.190

(part 1)

>>179

>Those existed in Marx's time already, and do you know what kind of shitshow the Second International was?

Marx and Engels engaged in sectarian politics, that's true, but the 1st and 2nd International did not attempt to exterminate political rivals.

>If anything the Marxist-Leninist principle of democratic centralism has overcome factionalism, at least until the Sino-Soviet split.

I would estimate that most of the Marxist parties that exist today originated in the factions expelled by the Comintern in the 1920s. Most of the contemporary ML parties seem to have formed after the fall of the USSR. The communist parties that were officially supported by the USSR seem to have dissolved themselves or merged with socdems in the 1990s. The CPGB is a good example. This being the case, the official version of democratic centralism promoted by the USSR was clearly a massive failure.

>Let's not give Leftcommunism and Trotkyism too much credit: They were fringe tendencies that botched everything they touched, the majority of all socialists were behind the Soviet Union.

They were fringe because the Comintern (under Zinoviev and later Stalin) expelled them.

>https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1969/08/statecapitalism.htm

I'll go into these arguments in depth another day, but for now I'll point out that Chris Harman pointed out the problems in Mandel's logic:

https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1969/12/mandel.htm

https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1990/xx/mandel.html

https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1990/xx/trotstatecap.html

>What does that even mean? People like Hannah Arendt, Pablo Picasso and Albert Einstein praised Stalin.

There are always people who praise authoritarian figures. There's even someone who praises Pol Pot on leftypol. In general, people know that Stalin = purges and GULAGs. This is what I mean by saying that the "moral value" of socialism was reduced.

>The anti-communist cliches surged when the Cold War started to unfold, suddenly you had figures like Robert Conquest (CIA asset) lying about death counts.

Leftcoms, Trots, and anarchist criticism of the USSR did not start during the Cold War. These criticisms began in the 1920s and 1930s when the USSR began purging and killing these groups.


 No.194

(part 2)

>>179

>https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/10/authority.htm

The interesting thing about this essay by Engels is that he seems to disagree with some fundamental ideas expounded by Marx.

Engels says:

>Furthermore, keeping the machines going requires an engineer to look after the steam engine, mechanics to make the current repairs, and many other labourers whose business it is to transfer the products from one room to another, and so forth. All these workers, men, women and children, are obliged to begin and finish their work at the hours fixed by the authority of the steam, which cares nothing for individual autonomy.

What Engels mentions above is a fundamental problem of capitalism. People are subordinated to productive forces instead of the other way around. In Capital, Marx describes the organization of workshops as a kind of "despotism". In chapter 14, Marx discusses how the division of labor (i.e. the subordination of people into separate roles within production) leads to a "crippling of body and mind".

Writing of the division of labor, Marx says:

>It increases the social productive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the capitalist instead of for that of the labourer, but it does this by crippling the individual labourers. It creates new conditions for the lordship of capital over labour. If, therefore, on the one hand, it presents itself historically as a progress and as a necessary phase in the economic development of society, on the other hand, it is a refined and civilised method of exploitation.

Engels says:

>If man, by dint of his knowledge and inventive genius, has subdued the forces of nature, the latter avenge themselves upon him by subjecting him, in so far as he employs them, to a veritable despotism independent of all social organisation. Wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself, to destroy the power loom in order to return to the spinning wheel.

If he's right, then Marx's project of an "association of free and equal producers" is doomed to failure. The entire point of socialism is to put the productive forces of society under control of society as a whole and to end the subordination of individuals to a production process.

In the manifesto, Marx writes:

>In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

This doesn't concur with the idea that Engels has about the subordination of individuals to the authority of machines or production processes. This is, in fact, entirely the opposite idea - that the goal of socialism is to use the productive power of modern machinery to end the subordination of man and create the possibility of his free development.


 No.195

(part 3)

>>179

In the Inaugural Address to the International Workingmen's Association, Marx said:

>By deed instead of by argument, they [the co-operative movement] have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of labor need not be monopolized as a means of dominion over, and of extortion against, the laboring man himself; and that, like slave labor, like serf labor, hired labor is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labor plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart.

This is a very different picture than the one Engels describes above. Here, Marx indicates that cooperative / associated production doesn't need a class of masters who dominate the production process. Engels says that, even if you elect a manager, he exists as an authority above other workers and they must obey his will.

In The German Ideology, it says:

>All earlier revolutionary appropriations were restricted… Their instrument of production became their property, but they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production. In all expropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all.

Notice here that in these early writings (possibly dictated by Marx and written by Engels) it speaks of the fact that the point of a proletarian revolution is to end the subordination of individuals to instruments of production and the division of labor.

In the general rules for the IWA Marx talks about the emancipation of the working class. But what kind of emancipation would it be if Engels says that your job would still subordinate you to a machine, there would be "the obedience of all to the will of one", etc. This is very different from Marx's vision of communism.


 No.199

>>181

>Labor was not a commodity in the SU. A use value can only become a commodity when it has lost it's use to owner. Seeing the socialist nations had near 100% employment, it can be deduced it wasn't a commodity.

For start, we can obviously definitely agree that USSR had wages. A quick recap by Stalin himself

<It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved, and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods.

And what does Marx consistently say on the subject of wage labour?

<Wages therefore are only a special name for the price of labour-power, and are usually called the price of labour; it is the special name for the price of this peculiar commodity, which has no other repository than human flesh and blood.

<Capital therefore presupposes wage-labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They condition each other; each brings the other into existence. Does a worker in a cotton factory produce only cotton? No. He produces capital. He produces values which serve anew to command his work and to create by means of it new values. Capital can multiply itself only by exchanging itself for labour-power, by calling wage-labour into life.

<The capitalist epoch is therefore characterised by this, that labour-power takes in the eyes of the labourer himself the form of a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently becomes wage-labour. On the other hand, it is only from this moment that the produce of labour universally becomes a commodity.

Even using your brain(try it sometimes) should tell you that wage labour is an exchange of two commodities, one being commodified labour power and the other being money, the commodity functioning as a general equivalent.

>Doing it any other way was impossible.

This being necessary is not relevant here. Lenin was precisely following Marx's analysis by conceding that NEP, while necessary at the time, was absolutely capitalist instead of creating abortions like "socialist commodity production". But since the Georgian manlet has decreed that USSR was socialism with socialist wages, socialist money, socialist prices, socialist profit("In this connection, such things as cost accounting and profitableness, production costs, prices, etc., are of actual importance in our enterprises.") and so on, imbeciles like you have decided this is a good hill to die on.

>Let's also be honest, it's not that you care about those things. They simply exist as excuses to have some form of "critisism" about USSR without thinking much about it.

What I care about is having a correct analysis as a result of scientific investigation in the current state of affairs, and stupid ideological bullshit by your ilk is anything but that.


 No.406

>>199

No point in trying. For MLs, Marx didn't exist, Marxism starts with Lenin and Stalin.


 No.407

i clicked a thingy and now im here, is this how communism works?


 No.409

File: f0cb2bc2c195154⋯.jpg (68.51 KB, 960x960, 1:1, f0cb2bc2c1951547f7ea08d46e….jpg)

>>407

it's true, this thread is literally how communism works.


 No.551

File: 35fbd21807283ef⋯.pdf (207.8 KB, 'state capitalism' in USSR.pdf)

>>90

>Created political division between Marxists and other left-wing ideologies.

It didn't create the divisions. The divisions were there from the get-go…

>Made people think that state-capitalism = socialism.

Someone addressed this already so I'll just post a PDF. Just going to state that unless you start playing around with the "muh wages" argument it fails, and the wages argument is just a manipulation by saying "See Marx sed" ignoring the Marx is neither the end all be all, and his theory was in reference to Capitalism and Communism. Wages are something that can exist under socialism simply because elimination of money is not something that can be done with a flick of the wrist.

>Reduced the "moral value" of socialist ideas in the eyes of many people.

Because Western propaganda and fearmongering based on literal lies is somehow the USSR's fault.

>Made socialism into something authoritarian and bureaucratic.

Marx outright states that socialism requires a dictatorship of the proletariat. This requires some system of authority and beauracracy. Even Catalonia had this FFS.

>Turned Marxist theory into a justification for whatever policy the USSR pursued at the time.

And that's a bad thing?

>Almost everything Stalin did.

Wow, that's totally not a poorly supported argument. Stalin is not without critisism but to say everything or almost everything he did was bad is fucking Plebbit historian levels of ignorance. Even a non-leftist who looks at the man objectively wouldn't state such a loaded and brash statement.


 No.557

>>199

>Muh Wages

Wage differentials can be implemented in transitory periods of time if needs be when a movement is in the process of building Communist socialism. You sound like you haven't even touched Paul Cockshott's works on this at all.


 No.560

>>551

>Stalin is not without critisism but to say everything or almost everything he did was bad is fucking Plebbit historian levels of ignorance. Even a non-leftist who looks at the man objectively wouldn't state such a loaded and brash statement.

+1


 No.623


 No.625

>>623

Even though I disagree and think you are grasping at straws, this is quite well done.


 No.626

>>623

Good work.


 No.627

>>560

Very nice.


 No.633

>>74

Remember when Britain and France kept dicking around and indirectly supporting Hitler throughout the 30s and tried to direct him into war with the USSR while ignoring Soviet calls for collective security?

LMAO.

>>75

We must critically use pragmatism to delay war and turn the mad attack dog onto its masters before it attacks us, LOL.

>>188

Part 1/2

>The only relevant period on that list is 1939.

No its not. At each step and actions in them led up to the results of 1939.

- In 1933 the Nazis came to power cutting off leftist progress in Germany and resulting in the USSR breaking off any positive relations outside pure diplomatic ones. Their Rightwing ideology from the beginning championed ideas of racism, imperialism and most importantly the intent to take on the East.

- In 1934 Germany and Poland grew closer on the singular idea of destroying the Russian/Bolshevik 'threat'.

- In 1936 Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in direct violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties… Britain and France decided to do nothing. Had they acted they could have stopped Hitler before he even began and they were in full legal right to do so.

- In 1938 Anschluss occurred, again violating the Versailles Treaty to no reaction from the Anglos or Frogs. THEN Germany moved on Czechoslovakia, and

Poland and Hungary also made grabs for Czechoslovakia. Poland also attempted to take Latvia until the USSR threatened war over it. The Brits and French not only did not stop him but outright HELPED Hitler get Czechoslovakia, and its many important industrial areas like Skoda.

This is a background to what occurred

Meanwhile the USSR:

- In 1933, USSR tried to sign a Pacific pact with Britain and USA to put a brake to Japanese imperialism, they declined.

- In late 1933, the Soviet government proposed an "Eastern pact", which was to be signed by several countries in opposition to Germany

- In 1936 the Soviet government proposed collective action to stop German aggression, the allies ignored it.

- In October 1937 at the Brussels Conference, USA and Britain rejected the Soviet proposal for the League of Nations to apply sanctions on Japan, after they had invaded China.

- In 1938, the Soviet government prepared to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia should they decide to fight Germany. Their government refused and the allies signed the Munich pact, giving Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

- In April 1939, Soviets proposed another military coalition against Nazi Germany in the event of an aggression in Eastern Europe

- The Soviets did one last attempt in July 1939, and proposed a military coalition with a plan laid out by Shaposhnikov to deploy 136 divisions to fight Nazi Germany, which the Polish government refused.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact was only signed after it was blatantly clear that the west would not act until Hitler invaded a west friendly power and was otherwise quite willing to be friendly with fascists. The British/French hoped instead that Hitler would invade Russia and take out the USSR which they themselves had invaded and tried to destroy 20 years earlier during the Revolution – the NAP was Russia's way of avoiding this since they clearly weren't ready to face the German army. An unhappy compromise, yes, but certainly not an alliance and certainly not their primary choice.


 No.634

File: 16ee71846b1e8dd⋯.png (123.8 KB, 1534x862, 767:431, ClipboardImage.png)

>>188

>>633

Part 2/2

> the possibility of the USSR simply withholding aid from Germany instead of shipping it massive quantities of vital raw materials during 1940-1941

Holy fuck you're that retard from the WW-2 Myths thread!

The USSR got out of that trade nearly 1 billion reichsmarks for what was essentially nothing in terms of supplies. 50% of the supplies were literally just wheat and grains, with metal supplies being less than nothing.

320 MILLION tonnes of wheat alone was produced in USSR 1941-1945, despite not having Ukraine or Belorus under their control for 3 of those years. That's 80 million tons per year. And yet much of the USSR was still on hunger rations despite producing that much. Now tell me, how much 1 million tons of wheat would do for Germany whose army was among the largest in the world even in 1940. Not a fucking lot. Moreover, most of the scrap metal the USSR sent Germany was low-end stuff unsuited for things like armor.

Beside the nearly 1 billion Reichsmarks the USSR got the unfinished cruiser Lutzow, dozens of top-of-the-line German military aircraft (such as the new Messerschmidt Bf-109E), dozens of tanks, trucks, artillery naval and terrestrial, and 300 pieces of various industrial machines/machining tools, which were used throughout the war to crank out T-34s and the like. Also hundreds of electromotors, compressors and other important pieces of tech that the USSR analyzed and threw into mass production. Germany was essentially swindled.

<In b4 Tooze

The context of the Tooze excerpt is the following.

1) Soviet exports made up roughly 50% of what Germany got

2) 50% of the export was wheat and grains.

3) That was for 1 year - 1940/41 - which in the over-all context of German industry (1939-1945) makes up a tiny percentage.

4) The Germans got raw supplies that required processing. They wouldn't get utilized until later, and both France and Britain had multiple chances to act to stop the Germans even in 1939 and 1940.

> The invasion of Finland turned a neutral neighbor into an enemy.

Who the fuck do you think you're kidding?

Finland was in the middle of talks with Germany and Britain and moreover Mannerheim, who led Finland was an avowed anti-communist who purged communists from Finland was hostile to the USSR. The USSR, seeing the inevitable German invasion, proposed a deal with Finland, exchanging a strip of land near Leningrad in return for 2x the landmass in another area. Despite the negotiators liking the idea, Mannerheim clearly ordered them to scuttle the talks and refuse at the last moment. The USSR was not taking no for an answer and took the area by force, leaving the rest of Finland alone. This action helped spare Leningrad by allowing for a corridor through Lake Ladoga.

>The Soviet invasion of the Baltic states

Welcomed by many. The anti-sovietism of the current Baltics is a cultivated nationalism that was not present in Soviet times.

>Invasion of Poland

Get your head out of your ass.

https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html

> led to separatist problems

Except that these issues didn't start cropping up until 2 generations later.


 No.635

>>634

>Invasion of Poland

Just some additional evidence for those who get assblasted by Furr

Here is the translated plans for Operation Weiss

http://doc20vek.ru/node/349

In those documents the German War plan mentions the 'russians' 2 times, and considered their entrance into the war as unlikely. The Red Army not only was not 'invading' but it even resorted to subterfuge to avoid conflicts with the Poles. A lot of tanks were draped with white bed sheets on the gun barrels. They told the Poles “We’ve come to help you against the Germans.” But by this time there were not many left. The Poles were either tightly encircled or trying to fight their way out of the country at the Romanian bridgehead.

The USSR's entrance into Poland was earlier than expected (as stated by Heinz Guderian), but ocurred after the Germans had effectively won the war. In the pact all that was agreed on about Poland was that it would be divided roughly along the Curzon Line. Stalin at first favoured a rump state but with the unexpected cowardice of Polish leadership opted for returning western Belarus to Belarus and western Ukraine to Ukraine.

Even the anti-soviet Churchill (who had been encouraging the execution of Operation Pike, a joint strike on the USSR by France and the UK) stated that the enterance into Poland was not an invasion.

https://ww2memories.wordpress.com/2011/09/24/churchills-ww2-speech-to-the-nation-october-1939/

This is in spite of the fact that the Winter War of that same year had every western imperialist howling their throats out over at the League of Nations, despite the similar ambiguity.

I'll add more to this:

https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Нота_правительства_СССР,_врученная_польскому_послу_в_Москве_утром_17_сентября_1939_года

The Poles were sent a diplomatic request asking if they had any problems with the Red Army entering Poland - this was when the Polish state still existed and therefore had the functions to respond with a denial - no denial came and afterwards the USSR entered.


 No.636

File: 3a2b9ea75c02b05⋯.png (396.33 KB, 765x599, 765:599, StalinRykovKamenevZinoviev.png)

>>634

>Remember when Britain and France kept dicking around and indirectly supporting Hitler throughout the 30s and tried to direct him into war with the USSR while ignoring Soviet calls for collective security?

Far better to wait until the eve of war then do a 180 and allow the Nazis to overrun Poland, then France, without fear of fighting on two fronts. It was another brilliant strategy by Comrade Stalin.

>We must critically use pragmatism to delay war and turn the mad attack dog onto its masters before it attacks us, LOL.

And the plan worked perfectly! Oh wait…

>50% of the supplies were literally just wheat and grains, with metal supplies being less than nothing.

All of those materials were desperately needed by Germany. Obtaining wheat and grain was a major motivation for invading the USSR, albeit based on mistaken calculations. The metals supplied by the Soviets were also critical to German production. They supplied 65% of German chromium ore, which is massively important for producing stainless steel, armor plating, gun barrels, ball bearings, aircraft engines, etc etc. Likewise, the Soviets provided Germany with 40% of its nickel imports, also useful for creating alloys for military production.

>Who the fuck do you think you're kidding?

Finland was not at war with the USSR. Then the USSR attacked Finland and they became enemies. Do you need me to draw you a picture?

>Welcomed by many. The anti-sovietism of the current Baltics is a cultivated nationalism that was not present in Soviet times.

Strange, then, that thousands of men from the Baltic region joined the Waffen-SS to fight the Soviets.

>Get your head out of your ass.

Furr is not acceptable as evidence.

>The Red Army not only was not 'invading' but it even resorted to subterfuge to avoid conflicts with the Poles. A lot of tanks were draped with white bed sheets on the gun barrels. They told the Poles "We’ve come to help you against the Germans."

Of course! It couldn't possibly have been an invasion because the Russians said it wasn't!

>Even the anti-soviet Churchill (who had been encouraging the execution of Operation Pike, a joint strike on the USSR by France and the UK) stated that the enterance into Poland was not an invasion.

And yet, if you actually READ his speech he says…

"We could have wished that the Russian armies should be standing on their present lines as the friends of the allies in Poland, instead of as invaders."

"…instead of as invaders."

INSTEAD OF AS INVADERS

question: why did Stalin always associate himself with undercover fascist agents? was he secretly a fascist? pic related.


 No.638

File: 32796ffbe244549⋯.jpg (178.84 KB, 1003x1332, 1003:1332, missing from gulag u.jpg)

>>636

>Far better to wait until the eve of war

Wow you're dumb. Germany was entering Poland either way, they had no borders with the USSR. Prior to 1939, Poland was all for a war with the USSR, but in 1939, they tried to welch out of starting the war with the Soviets, so Germany decides that it would take Poland and make it a vassal state. 3 Million soldiers under German command. The USSR, unable to get any anti-Hitler pacts from the West decided to make the best of the situation and return Western Belarus and Ukraine to the USSR, establishing a buffer zone.

>allow the Nazis to overrun Poland, then France, without fear of fighting on two fronts

Go back to the thread coward. France being "over-run" was literally all on France. France paid for its own incompetence and appeasement of the fascists to the point of not helping its ally Poland in any meaningful way. The USSR had obligations only to itself. Establishing a delay to the war. Neither Germany, nor the USSR expected either France or Poland to fold so quickly… mostly because they underestimated how incompetent the West really was.

So yes, it was a brilliant strategy.

>And the plan worked perfectly!

It worked better than expected. France got its come-uppance for ignoring the repeated Versailles Treaty violations

>All of those materials were desperately needed by Germany.

No, not really.

> The metals supplied by the Soviets were also critical to German production

Except they weren't.

>They supplied 65% of German chromium ore

FOR THE YEAR 1940 YOU RETARD. Over the war from 1939-1945 the USSR's chromium was a drop in a bucket.

>the Soviets provided Germany with 40% of its nickel imports

FOR THE YEAR 1940. Do you specialize in manipulation or something?

>Finland was not at war with the USSR. Then the USSR attacked Finland and they became enemies.

Wow, the sheer ignorance of the geopolitics of the situation is mindboggling. The USSR actively tried to prevent war and offered a deal that benefited Finalnd more than the USSR. Finland rejected it because they were pro-fascist and were intent on letting the Germans to enter from the North as invaders have done before.

>Furr is not acceptable as evidence.

No argument also see >>635

> It couldn't possibly have been an invasion because the Russians said it wasn't!

1) that's not an argument, that's just attacking the source

2) Yes the Russians said so… as did International law, and several important countries of the League of Nations you ignorant manipulator.

>INSTEAD OF AS INVADERS

<ignores the rest of the entire speech

<ignores the context

<ignores that the Polish borders over-ran the BRITISH established Curzon line, which was the original Soviet border

Also you lovingly ignored the next line,

"But that the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace."

You also ignored the rest of the posts.

>thousands of men from the Baltic region joined the Waffen-SS

And thousands became partisans and/or joined the Red Army. It's well known that the majority of the Baltic population got evacuated, 10s of thousands of people.

>why did Stalin always associate himself with undercover fascist agents

poor bait.


 No.639

File: e82184b36927c45⋯.png (305.92 KB, 581x598, 581:598, Feeding the German Eagle, ….png)

File: 9614bbdf95fc2eb⋯.png (111.98 KB, 552x880, 69:110, Feeding the German Eagle, ….png)

File: 1d350ae7e46d139⋯.png (34.54 KB, 562x424, 281:212, tooze_321.png)

>>638

Do you ever get tired of being so wrong?

"Without Soviet deliveries of these four major items (oil, grain, manganese, and rubber), however, Germany barely could have attacked the Soviet Union, let alone come close to victory. Germany's stockpiles of oil, manganese, and grain would have been completely exhausted by the late summer of 1941. And Germany's rubber supply would have run out half a year earlier."

"In other words, Hitler had been almost completely dependent on Stalin to provide him the resources he needed to attack the Soviet Union."


 No.646

>>639

1/2

>Do you ever get tired of being so wrong?

Ask yourself that. Besides the bare statistics those quotes are literal opinions and your use of them is an argument by authority fallacy.

For example Pic 1 states that it was

>"the wrong move"

yet even Churchill and several others stated that it was the only option he had left to delay the war.

It next says

>very nearly wiped out the Soviet State

Nani? Even the over-all soviet losses of the war was less than 10% of the population. The German army never got in deeper than 1/5 of the way into the USSR, and not without the support of millions of volunteers from across Europe, as well as the industrial works of Europe. Even at Moscow the USSR had a back-up capital ready in case of it falling, as it had with Napoleon, but the fact of the matter was that the German blitzkrieg had ran out of steam trying to keep going through Soviet defensive line after defensive line, something that the buffer zone acquired after Poland's fall helped a lot in. Brest Fortress alone lasted a month and forced the Germans to spend disproportionate resources taking down.

Next the text states

>"not decisive in the Battle of France"

Then how is that Stalin's fault? The French incompetence led to their own defeat despite having the advantage. The French dropped the ball on their final chance to stop Hitler after dozens of chances.

>"Aided Hitler in eliminating other major armies"

<literally admitted that Soviet trade had little influence on Battle of France

That's ignoring the fact that Stalin had no obligation to the rest of Europe (they having ignored the dozen or so attempts at anti-fascist coalitions that would have prevented this). Moreover having them fight it out with Germany was only to the USSR's advantage. How was Stalin to know that the French, the Poles and the British were so incompetent as to lose to German forces they technically outmatched? It's quite easy to criticize from your 21st century high-horse.

>oil

Do you want to know the oil production of the USSR in 1940? Over 31 million tons of oil. In 1940, Germany received from the Soviet Union 657 thousand tons of petroleum products, that is, 4.6% of its total annual reserves. that 657,000 tons was only 2.1% of Soviet Oil Production for that year (ignoring soviet oil reserves). Moreover the total oil export from the USSR was roughly 900,000 over-all. At best that is 7-8% of the German annual reserves… literally a drop in the bucket.

>Grain

As your own Pic-2 indicates, only a few months of 1941 did the Germans get any significant amount of wheat. The USSR produced 95.6 million tons of grains in 1940, and less than 1 million tons, or about 1%, were exported to Germany… The USSR continued to produce approximately 320 million tons of grain from 1941-45… and the country was starving. the German population was smaller than the USSR… but 1 million tons of grain wouldn't feed them for more than a few months.

>manganese

I've been looking at the export documents and don;t see anything about major manganese exports. As for Rubber… fucking what? That is from Ericson's Soviet Aid to the Nazi Eagle or whatever that rubbish book was called, and I never saw great evidence to that end.


 No.647

>>639

>>646

2/2

>German stockpiles would be exhausted in late summer 1941

This is literal projection. You're telling me that without 4.6% of the their oil the German war-machine would stop in LATE SUMMER?, less than 2 months into the campaign? What drugs are you taking to actually believe this shit?

The USSR occupied the fifth place in Germany’s imports (after Italy, Denmark, Romania and Holland, yet somehow it was mostly the USSR that made the German invasion possible… despite 50% of the TOTAL export being almost entirely wheat and grains… and even then so little that it wouldn't last Germany for very long at all. For the first six months of the agreement (to August 1940, less than a year before Operation Barbarossa), the USSR agreement carried out only 28% of the deliveries envisaged for the year - equipment for 84.2 million Reichsmarks was sent from Germany, and the USSR sent raw materials for 119.1 million Reichsmarks. Supplies from the USSR accounted for only 6.9% of Germany’s total imports. So please do tell me again how it was "EVUL SHTOOPID SHTALIN" who 'fed' the Reich.

Also you again ignore what the USSR got out of this:

The USSR, in exchange, received an unfinished heavy cruiser Lutzov and equipment necessary to complete its construction; samples of ship artillery, mines, torpedoes, periscopes; samples of the latest models of aircraft; samples of artillery, tanks, communications. Also, samples of more than 300 types of machines and machines : excavators, drilling rigs, electric motors, compressors, pumps, steam turbines, oil equipment, etc.

In April, the USSR used its right to “temporarily suspend its deliveries” due to low “enthusiasm” in deliveries from the German side - supplies of highly demanded oil and grain were stopped. As a result, the supply of German goods became more active - From April 25 to May 15, Germany delivered: 2 Dornier-215 aircraft, 5 Messerschmitt-109E aircraft, 5 Messerschmitt-110 aircraft, 2 Junkers-88 aircraft, 3 aircraft " Heinkel-100 ", 3 aircraft "Bükker-131" and 3 aircraft "Bükker-133". On June 5, another 2 Heinkel-100 aircraft were received - at the end of May Lutzov arrived in Leningrad. The Lutzov became the cruiser Petropalovsk and later renamed Tallin, and took part in the defense of Leningrad with its artillery fending off German terrestrial and naval attack and its AAA helping defend the harbor from bombing. The USSR got a ready-made cruiser in exchange for a relatively low amount of raw materials that required processing and utilization. Even if the USSR sent the exact amount of materials it would take to build another Lutzow… that's irrelevant if they don't actually process/utilize it and then CONSTRUCT it.

Moreover in January of 1941 the agreements terms were re-assessed and changed, further making it better for the USSR and STRAINING THE GERMAN ECONOMY!!!!

In the first half of 1941, about half of all German supplies from September 1939 to June 1941 were sent to the USSR. However, the implementation of reciprocal deliveries under the threat of their termination in violation of the agreed volume, strained the German economy and became more and more difficult for it. From January 1941 until the beginning of the aggression of Germany and its satellites against the USSR, German goods and weapons were exported to the USSR for 220.9 million Reichsmarks, and the USSR sent raw materials for 206.1 million Reichsmarks.

In other words the USSR sold a tiny portion of its consumable resources for a jacked up price to the Germans. While getting important long-term investment products in exchange.

If you had the balls you'd go back to the Soviet myths thread and post this shit there, see how far you'll get with your cherrypicking faggotry. Here you're safe since it /marxism/ has a tiny PPH and few people know about your posting here.


 No.652

File: 418be89c39548d4⋯.png (147.37 KB, 500x800, 5:8, german oil stocks.png)

File: e4583730dbd5ab1⋯.png (111.57 KB, 500x800, 5:8, german manganese stocks.png)

File: 868a100ec1204df⋯.png (118.04 KB, 500x800, 5:8, german rubber stocks.png)

>>646

>>647

I'm going to sum up my arguments.

Originally you stated:

>>>/leftypol/2922996

>The USSR got out of that trade nearly 1 billion reichsmarks for what was essentially nothing in terms of supplies. 50% of the supplies were literally just wheat and grains, with metal supplies being less than nothing.

1. Even if grain comprised 50% of exports to Germany, that grain was desperately needed by Germany. Like I showed above, without Soviet grain the Germans would have exhausted their stocks by June 1941.

2. Aside from grain, the Soviets also supplied Germany with key industrial materials like manganese, rubber, and oil. Without Soviet imports, Germany would have exhausted its supplies of rubber by May 1941 or earlier. Without Soviet oil, Germany's stocks of aviation, motor, and diesel products would have been exhausted by October 1941. Likewise, Germany's stocks of manganese would have been exhausted in October 1941 without Soviet imports.

3. The Soviets also supplied Germany with (according to Adam Tooze) 65% of its chrome ore and 40% of nickel imports during 1940. The lack of these supplies may not have crippled Germany in the short-term, but it was definitely not "less than nothing."

I am going to divide your responses into arguments and non-arguments.

First, the real arguments:

>Besides the bare statistics those quotes are literal opinions and your use of them is an argument by authority fallacy.

It would only be an argument by authority if I based my argument on someone else's opinion. I haven't done that - I've provided statistical evidence. Ericson's conclusion summarizes the main points.

>very nearly wiped out the Soviet State

I don't necessarily disagree with you on this part. The Germans did massive damage to the USSR but probably wouldn't have won the war even if they had managed to succeed in winning a few more major battles.

>How was Stalin to know that the French, the Poles and the British were so incompetent as to lose to German forces they technically outmatched?

To be fair, this is also part of Ericson's conclusion. Ericson argued that Stalin's choices were essentially rational but proven wrong by later events. I lean towards being more critical of Stalin's decisions than Ericson, but it's rather pointless to play counter-factual games.

>The USSR occupied the fifth place in Germany’s imports (after Italy, Denmark, Romania and Holland, yet somehow it was mostly the USSR that made the German invasion possible

The total monetary value of imports/exports is less important than the specific quantity and type of the materials being traded. Again, what's important for this discussion is to realize that the USSR's grain exports accounted for 76% of German stocks by May 1941. Germany would have exhausted their stocks of grain entirely by the end of June without Soviet imports.

>Moreover the total oil export from the USSR was roughly 900,000 over-all. At best that is 7-8% of the German annual reserves… literally a drop in the bucket.

Wrong. Soviet exports to Germany accounted for 53% of their total stocks of oil in June 1941. If one only looks at aviation, motor, and diesel stocks this rises to 64%.

>I've been looking at the export documents and don;t see anything about major manganese exports. As for Rubber… fucking what?

Pic related.


 No.653

Continued…

Non-arguments:

>Do you want to know the oil production of the USSR in 1940? Over 31 million tons of oil. In 1940, Germany received from the Soviet Union 657 thousand tons of petroleum products, that is, 4.6% of its total annual reserves.

This is irrelevant. The point being disputed is whether or not Soviet imports were critical to Germany's economy. Production volume and size of reserves in the USSR doesn't matter. We're talking about Germany.

>You're telling me that without 4.6% of the their oil the German war-machine would stop in LATE SUMMER?

Again, mentioning that oil exports comprised 4.6% of Soviet production is irrelevant because we are talking about Soviet oil as a percentage of German stocks. This is a non-argument.

>The USSR produced 95.6 million tons of grains in 1940, and less than 1 million tons, or about 1%, were exported to Germany… The USSR continued to produce approximately 320 million tons of grain from 1941-45…

Non-argument. We are discussing Germany's production and stocks, not the USSR.

>Moreover in January of 1941 the agreements terms were re-assessed and changed, further making it better for the USSR and STRAINING THE GERMAN ECONOMY!!!!

Non-argument. The German economy would have been even more strained if the USSR hadn't been willing to supply it with critical materials.

>The USSR, in exchange, received an unfinished heavy cruiser Lutzov and equipment necessary to complete its construction; samples of ship artillery, mines, torpedoes, periscopes; samples of the latest models of aircraft; samples of artillery, tanks, communications. Also, samples of more than 300 types of machines and machines…

Irrelevant. The question is whether Germany received substantial benefits from Soviet trade or not.


 No.655

>>652

1/2

>Even if grain comprised 50% of exports to Germany, that grain was desperately needed by Germany.

>without Soviet grain the Germans would have exhausted their stocks by June 1941.

Except you haven't shown that. The German Wheat and grain stocks only got Soviet supplies in 1941 and they were inconsequential in the over-all wheat consumption of Germany from 1939-1945.

>key industrial materials

Really?

>Oil

I demonstrated over-all stats relative to oil with statistics as well. Soviet oil was not crucial to the Germans since it barely made up 5% of their annual stock for 1940. Soviet supplies were in 5th place in terms of supplying… so they physically cannot be crucial when their supplies are puny compared to the next 4 countries.

Hell did you even read your own charts or understand them? The Total Soviet Exports per month is exponential because its additive. so for Jan 1940 it was 19,000 tons of oil and for Feb 1940, it was 48,000 tons… that 48,000 includes the 19,000 from the previous month because its counting the amount of total soviet export at that specific time, not from that specific month. the same goes for grain and other resources. This indicates that Soviet resources were sent slowly over a period of time and were not a major part of the actual German reserves.

>65% of its chrome ore and 40% of nickel imports during 1940.

This shit again. Yes I know what Tooze wrote, I have his goddamn book. However you're again ignoring the context of it. 65% of IMPORTS FOR 1940. Not 65% of total Chrome reserves, nor is it it 65% over the entire war period.

I'll explain with an anologous situation in the Lend Lease

Rail cars

Soviet Production: 2635

Allied Deliveries: 11,075

Total: 13,710

Allied Proportion: 80.7%

Allied Imports from 1941-45 are 80.7% of Soviet Rail Cars… HOWEVER The USSR started off the war with roughly 500,000 Rail cars. The Allied total rail car delivery is approximately 2% of the entire Soviet rolling stock. The same applies here but with your Manganese, Oil and other supplies. Verstehen?

> if I based my argument on someone else's opinion.

Except you do. You're basing your argument around the assertion that Soviet supplies were important to the German industry. However that is untrue, since Soviet imports were short-term (less than a year) and consisted of a tiny percentage of Germany's over-all reserves and even smaller percentages of Soviet production. While certain materials may have made up large percentages of IMPORTS, the same cannot be said of actual reserves.

>Ericson argued that Stalin's choices were essentially rational but proven wrong by later events.

Stalin predicted many things ahead of time and brought up counter-measures accordingly. Nothing is ever even close to 100% assured in geo-politics however, and thus not everything goes smoothly. The Nazis themselves expected to only start WW-2 in the mid-1940s when they had finished building their fleet and army up. But because of their own hyper-consumptive economy they had to expand to feed their build up and after repeated diplomatic concessions by Britain and France they did not expect a declaration of war. However they were also not planning to conquer Poland, at least not directly, instead hoping to use their friendly ties over the 1930s to encourage it to go to war with the USSR with them. Stalin decided that, since having Western Allies would be unlikely in the future, he would instead cause division in Europe, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, this immediately set the Poles against the Germans and automatically the Germans against the French/British. The USSR made the most of this. Poland was planned to be a rump-state but with the quick surrender of the Poles Stalin changed the plan into re-introducing the areas of West Belorus/Ukraine into the USSR and building fortifications there. They expected the French, Germans and British to have a long slog, resulting in either German defeat or at the least an exhaustion of their military. But while the French military was certainly powerful… its commanders with the exclusion of De Gaulle were hot garbage and in a surprising turn of events let the Germans win with almost no trouble. Moreover the equipment abandoned at Dunkirk and in the fields of France gave the German army a good boost in equipment.


 No.656

>>655

>>652

2/2

> total monetary value of imports/exports is less important than the specific quantity and type of the materials being traded

True to an extent… but monetary value at some point indicates importance, and clearly Soviet supplies were less important in German eyes than those from the Danes.

>USSR's grain exports accounted for 76% of German stocks by May 1941

Which is minuscule in terms of over-all Grain reserves. Or are you telling me that Germany, with a population of nearly 70 million people could live on 1 million tons of grain for over a year? The USSR had roughly 2 times the population of German, at best 3, and yet it had to produce nearly 100 million tons of grain to feed itself AND its live-stock. So explain to me logically how 1 million tons could be feasibly important in the long run?

>Soviet exports to Germany accounted for 53% of their total stocks of oil in June 1941

So you're telling me that in 1940, when Germany received 2/3 of soviet oil exports to Germany, it was 4.6% of annual reserves… yet in June 1941 this jumped up over 50% with the final 1/3?

To paraphrase from the work of Dr. Peter W. Becker's The Role of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany:

In 1938 (peacetime) Germany consumed 44 million barrels of oil. The USSR consumed 183, the UK 76 and the USA over 1 billion. In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas account for 28 million barrels, roughly 60% of total supply. 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. The total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels)

In 1939 when the war began, Germany’s total fuel stockpile consisted of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added 5 million barrels more captured, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. A High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels while imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941.

Now lets calc that up.

Soviet over-all imports 5.6 million barrels

German Stockpile: 15 million barrels

German captured: 5 million barrels

German monthly use: 7.25 million barrels

The USSR's imports of oil make up about 1/5th of total German stockpile, and only German hyper-consumption inflates the proportion of Soviet imports.

The Germans produced 8 million tons of oil in 1939 and 6.7 million in 1940 and 7.3 million in 1941. Romanian exports in 1941 rose to nearly 13 million. Easily out sizing the petty 1.6 million barrels of the USSR.

So it can be concluded that with or without Soviet oil imports the Nazis wouldn't last past August. That is why they put so much emphasis on trying to get to Baku and Grozny. And why they were on fumes, even after capturing Maikop, which produced 19 million barrels annually.


 No.657

>>653

>This is irrelevant

How? it provides important context and moreover information. SOVIET OIL IMPORTS WERE 4.6% of TOTAL ANNUAL RESERVES. So how are Soviet imports critical when they make up so little a percentage?

>Production volume and size of reserves in the USSR doesn't matter

They do when factoring in why the USSR sold oil to their predicted future enemy… because it wasn't enough to do anything important with. It was a thimble-full of oil compared the bucket that the USSR had, they lost nothing from selling it.

>mentioning that oil exports comprised 4.6% of Soviet production

The 627,000 tons of oil was 2 percent of Soviet production and 4,6% of Total GERMAN annual oil reserves

>non argument

It is an argument when we consider populational needs. 1 million tons is roughly 1.1% of Soviet grain production, and the USSR consumed most of their own grain… again, how would 1 million tons of food assist the German WAR economy when it would consume that in a few months at best if not less.

>The German economy would have been even more strained if the USSR hadn't been willing to supply it with critical materials.

But then the USSR would be denying itself of a cruiser almost ready for duty… A CAPITAL WARSHIP, A SERIOUS MILITARY INVESTMENT as well as hundreds of pieces of machinery that they used IN THE WAR to boost production. Moreover the dozens of military aircraft let the USSR know what the German military had and what to prepare for, without having to rely on reports from diplomatic military attache.

>The question is whether Germany received substantial benefits from Soviet trade or not.

No, the question is whether the USSR made a "colossal blunder". This entails a comparison of what the USSR got out of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and following treaties, and what Germany got out of it, and determine who got the better deal.

Germany's Soviet imports were miniscule in the over-all war and were raw materials that required processing and utilization, which in itself requires time, energy and MORE resources.

The USSR's sheer production meant that what it sold did nothing to impact its capacity to function. Moreover it got an entire heavy cruiser - important in the defense of Leningrad, Dozens of modern planes and other vehicles - allowing the Soviet military to know the military power of their enemy and providing examples for reverse-engineering anything worthwhile, and finally hundreds of industrial and agricultural machinery - unlike raw resources these are long-term investments that will continue to serve for years or decades and which were actively utilized in industrial plants around the USSR to increase production, especially during the war. There are places in Russia that STILL use this nazi made machinery.


 No.659

>>655

>The German Wheat and grain stocks only got Soviet supplies in 1941 and they were inconsequential in the over-all wheat consumption of Germany from 1939-1945.

Soviet wheat exports to Germany began in January 1940 - not 1941. Like the stats show, without these wheat imports Germany would have exhausted their stocks of wheat by June 1941. This is not a matter of debate.

>I demonstrated over-all stats relative to oil with statistics as well. Soviet oil was not crucial to the Germans since it barely made up 5% of their annual stock for 1940.

Soviet oil imports accounted for a little over 33% of German stocks in 1940.

Total Soviet oil imports by Dec 1940 - 622,000 tons.

Total German oil stocks by Dec 1940 - 1,810,000 tons.

Germany never possessed more than 2,010,000 tons of oil reserves at any given time in 1940. And that was in September, at which time Soviet imports had reached a cumulative 495,000 tons, i.e. 25% of total reserves. Your numbers are fucked.

>While certain materials may have made up large percentages of IMPORTS, the same cannot be said of actual reserves.

See above.

>So explain to me logically how 1 million tons could be feasibly important in the long run?

I've already explained this, you idiot. The Germans would have undergone a shortage without those imports. That's precisely what makes them important.

>The USSR's imports of oil make up about 1/5th of total German stockpile

First you said 4.6%, now you say 20%. Come on, dude.


 No.660

>>659

>Soviet wheat exports to Germany began in January 1940 - not 1941

Yes but the majority of it was imported in 1941, as your own fucking chart shows.

>without these wheat imports Germany would have exhausted their stocks of wheat by June 1941.

You changed it from Late Summer to June 1941. and you're still ignoring that Soviet Wheat barely extended it for more than a few months… which in the actual context of the whole war makes it inconsequential.

>This is not a matter of debate

piss off.

>Total Soviet oil imports by Dec 1940 - 622,000 tons.

>Total German oil stocks by Dec 1940 - 1,810,000 tons.

Good job at ignoring everything I wrote.

>Germany never possessed more than 2,010,000 tons of oil reserves at any given time in 1940

>in September, at which time Soviet imports had reached a cumulative 495,000 tons, i.e. 25% of total reserves. Your numbers are fucked.

My numbers are based on generally accepted information.

>See above.

I can say the same, see prior posts

>The Germans would have undergone a shortage without those imports.

THEY were going through a shortage WITH the imports, an extension of a few months is a drop of piss in the bucket of the war and its resources.

>First you said 4.6%, now you say 20%. Come on, dude.

Do you have short-sightedness or ADD? Because I can't explain your intentional obtuse skim-reading with anything but either physical disability or denial.

The majority of Soviet oil imports came in 1940. They made up 4.6% of TOTAL ANNUAL RESERVES. The 1/5th is because by 1941 (not 1940) German oil expenditure increased and imports from over-seas were blocked by the allies. This meant that Germany's main oil income was cut, even while it was importing Soviet oil, which prior to that blockade was a small amount now became a larger portion of the stockpile, which shrank. Just like imports the stockpile is not permanent. A stockpile will change with consumption and import rates, the USSR import rate did not increase, but German consumption increased, while its main import sources were cut off, suddenly placing the USSR from a minor trade partner to 5th place. This does not mean that Soviet supplies were critical but that their value rose due to scarcity caused by Allied economic block. The Soviet supply, having remained consistent was too low to prevent the Germans from collapsing, hell the only reason they even started the war that early was because they did not have enough oil from the USSR and were struggling to keep up their end of the deal. The USSR essentially pushed the German economy into decline, a decline that only war could reverse (temporarily) and only through stealing resources from the countries they took over. Taking away the Soviet supplies would simply mean that Germany would launch war against the USSR all the more earlier, and thus when the Red Army was all the more unprepared.

(USER WAS BANNED FOR THIS POST)

 No.723

File: f4b38fd3ab7a5c2⋯.jpg (150.21 KB, 1280x720, 16:9, f4b38fd3ab7a5c2d50d7c25ded….jpg)

>>660

>The majority of Soviet oil imports came in 1940. They made up 4.6% of TOTAL ANNUAL RESERVES.

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 No.742

Interrupting this autistic back-and-forth to mention that I found Louis Proyect's bloghole this week, including this series of posts he wrote on the early Comintern.

http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mydocs/organization/comintern_and_germany.htm

Does anyone know much about this? I had assumed that it did good work until Stalin but reading this it seems like the Comintern was fucked from the start. The Soviets forcing through a bunch of restrictive organizational conditions for membership, and them bumbling the absolute fuck out of the KPD's attempts to incite revolution in the early 20s, meant most of the early communist parties were fucked from the start.

So much for Soviet internationalism, I guess.


 No.745

>>742

>Interrupting this autistic back-and-forth to mention that I found Louis Proyect's bloghole this week, including this series of posts he wrote on the early Comintern.

Louis Proyect sometimes has interesting things to say although I feel that he likes to beat the dead horse of democratic centralism too much. He even blamed adherence to democratic centralism for the failure of the American ISO and rape scandals within Trotskyist organizations. I think he goes way too far in that regard.

>Does anyone know much about this? I had assumed that it did good work until Stalin but reading this it seems like the Comintern was fucked from the start.

The failure of the European revolution led to immediate consequences for the communist movement as a whole. Due to the fact that only the Russian Revolution had succeeded (albeit only in a narrow political sense), the center of power and influence within the international movement shifted to Russia. This made it all too easy for the Bolsheviks to transform the new international into an instrument of the Soviet state via the policy of "Bolshevization."

"The purpose of the Congress—which has gone down in history as the “Bolshevization Congress”—was to change the policies and internal structures of the other parties to make them subservient to the Russian party. The primary idea, unanimously accepted, was that the Russian party was the only truly Bolshevik (that is, revolutionary) party and therefore all other parties had to be loyal and subordinate to it. The prestige of the Russian Revolution, particularly after the failure of other revolutions, made this easier for leading Communists to accept. Until then, though the Russian leaders had great authority, it was based on political persuasion and the confidence its own ideas and experience inspired in others. Now its authority could not be questioned. In the future every party was expected to carry out instructions from the Russian party, in reality from its Politburo."

"Until 1924, the Communist International and its affiliated parties were full of robust, democratic debates. The organizational conclusions of Zinoviev’s Bolshevization campaign were the start to ending this lively independence and turning the Communist parties from being vehicles of revolution into pawns of the Russian CP, from vanguards of revolution into Russia’s border guards. The organizational methods to accomplish this goal, which would take another three to five years to finally complete, began the process of stamping out workers’ democracy in the various affiliate parties. The measures themselves were the opposite of the norms of Leninism that had existed until then."

"Prior to 1924, the concept of a monolithic party, a party without differences, did not exist. “The first appearance of the epithet ‘monolithic’ as applied to the party was in the resolution of the thirteenth party conference of January 1924 which condemned Trotsky” and opposed his views of the party to Bolshevism as “a monolithic whole.”43 The fact of this being raised and accepted was a reflection of how far the degeneration had proceeded."

https://isreview.org/issue/93/zinovievism-and-degeneration-world-communism

"The political party has the role of gathering together and uniting whatever these actions have in common, from the point of view of the revolutionary goals of the working class of the world as a whole. Unity inside the party, the suppression of internal differences of opinion, the disappearance of factional struggles, will be a proof that the party is on the best path for carrying out its tasks correctly. But if differences of opinion do exist, this will prove that the party is marred by errors; that the party does not have the capacity to radically combat the degenerative tendencies of the working class movement, which normally manifest themselves at certain crucial moments in the general situation. If one is faced by cases of indiscipline, this is a symptom showing that this fault still exists in the party. Discipline, in fact, is a result, not a point of departure, not some kind of unshakeable platform. Moreover, this corresponds to the voluntary nature of entry into our organisation. This is why a kind of party penal code cannot be a remedy for frequent episodes of lack of discipline."

"In recent times, a regime of terror has been established in our parties, a kind of sport, which consists in intervening, punishing, annihilating — and all of this with a special pleasure, as if this were precisely the ideal of party life."

https://www.marxists.org/archive/bordiga/works/1926/comintern.htm


 No.746

File: 59591813d6c06bd⋯.jpg (24.01 KB, 460x360, 23:18, anton_pannekoek.jpg)

Pannekoek explains the material conditions behind Soviet (and Comintern) policy in the 1920s:

"The basis of these policies can readily be identified in the needs of the Soviet republic. The reactionary insurgents Kolchak and Denikin have destroyed the foundations of the Russian iron industry, and the war effort has forestalled a powerful upsurge in production. Russia urgently needs machines, locomotives and tools for economic reconstruction, and only the undamaged industry of the capitalist countries can provide these. It therefore needs peaceful trade with the rest of the world, and in particular with the nations of the Entente; they in their turn need raw materials and foodstuffs from Russia to stave off the collapse of capitalism. The sluggish pace of revolutionary development in Western Europe thus compels the Soviet republic to seek a modus vivendi with the capitalist world, to surrender a portion of its natural wealth as the price of doing so, and to renounce direct support for revolution in other countries. In itself there can be no objection to an arrangement of this kind, which both parties recognise to be necessary; but it would hardly be surprising if the sense of constraint and the initiation of a policy of compromise with the bourgeois world were to foster a mental disposition towards more moderate perspectives. The Third International, as the association of communist parties preparing proletarian revolution in every country, is not formally bound by the policies of the Russian government, and it is supposed to pursue its own tasks completely independent of the latter. In practice, however, this separation does not exist; just as the CP is the backbone of the Soviet republic, the executive committee is intimately connected with the Praesidium of the Soviet republic through the persons of its members, thus forming an instrument whereby this Praesidium intervenes in the politics of Western Europe. We can now see why the tactics of the Third International, laid down by Congress to apply homogeneously to all capitalist countries and to be directed from the centre, are determined not only by the needs of communist agitation in those countries, but also by the political needs of Soviet Russia."

https://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/1920/communist-tactics.htm


 No.753

>>76

Prove they were 1. general staff 2. executed.


 No.754

>>76

>Kills bureaucrats and replaces them with working people.

Based and proletariat pilled.


 No.765

File: b7ac502cbee67f5⋯.png (375.72 KB, 727x693, 727:693, leftcomfy.png)

Can anyone recommend to me a good book explaining the fall of the Soviet Union? What the state of their politics/economy was, what leaders and bureaucrats thought at the time, etc.

Bonus points if it's written from a sympathetic/Marxist perspective, of course.


 No.766

File: 5902442037dbbbb⋯.jpg (34.17 KB, 400x533, 400:533, revolution_from_above.jpg)

>>765

Pic related is pretty good.

You can find a pdf version here:

http://gen.lib.rus.ec/search.php?&req=revolution+from+above




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